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CHAPTER IV 
I AM THAT I AM 
Sonnet 121 resembles 129 in several ways: in its concern with lust; in its 
discrimination between the individual and the world; and in the rhetorical 
obtrusiveness of its opening: 
'Tis better to be vile than vile esteemed 
When not to be receives reproach of being, 
And the just pleasure lost, which is so deemed 
Not by our feeling but by others' seeing. 
For why should others' false adulterate eyes 
Give salutation to my sportive blood? 
Or on my frailties why are frailer spies, 
Which in their wills count bad what I think good? 
No, I am that I am; and they that level 
At my abuses reckon up their own, 
I may be straight though they themselves be bevel; 
By their rank thoughts my deeds must not be shown, 
Unless this general evil they maintain - 
All men are bad and in their badness reign. 
Obviously enough, however, this poem presents lust, not as "a waste of 
shame" nor as an "expense of spirit," but as an expression of natural vigor 
and a "just pleasure." From this difference in basic opinion arises a still 
more interesting difference. Whereas in 129 the poet discriminates between 
conventional wisdom and personal experience, inhabiting that poem chiefly 
as an intelligence, in 121 he steps forward in the flesh to participate in a 
conflict between personal conduct and public censure. 
The poet does not assert his independence from social pressure in 121 
until the third quatrain, but his sense of conflict is evident from the 
beginning. Line 1 opposes a certain form of personal behavior, "to be 
vile," against the general condemnation of vileness: the passive voice in the 
second half of the line implies the wide and uniform judgment of society. 
The impression of conflict is heightened by a couple of local tensions in the 
line. In its first half, the reader encounters the anomaly of describing "viIe" 
behavior as "better"; and in its second half, he faces the conjunction of 
"vile"-and, as it seems for a second, of "vilest"-with a term, 
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"esteemed," that normally signalizes a positive judgment, that is, a 
judgment that some person or  action is estimable. The major opposition 
defined in line 1 is dynamic in itself since the linking term, "than," spelled 
"then" in the 1609 edition,' presents a serious equivocation: Shakespeare 
has played upon this orthographic identity in the second line of Sonnet 40, 
"What hast thou then more then thou hadst before"; and also, perhaps, in 
the second Iine of 71. In 121 the ambivalence of "then" allows the 
secondary meaning: it is better to be vile in fact and then judged vile. This 
option, which suggests the desirability of just and equitable public 
judgments, illuminates the poet's cynical response to society's actual in- 
justice. Since this meaning of the first line precisely balances the primary 
meaning of  the second line, it also allows a narrow focus for the whole line- 
pair: it is better to be vile and then to  be judged vile when not being vile is 
judged vile anyway. This manageable cynicism, we may notice, fits nicely 
with the condition that is supposed and deplored in the couplet. 
Because of the "better . . . than" pattern of the first line and because 
of its metrical definition, a definition enforced by the inversion of 
"esteemed . . . vile," its more complex meaning predominates-even if 
not, as modern editors would have it, to the exclusion of the other. And this 
meaning, which stands in an oblique relationship with that of line 2, 
suggests a tangle of ethical questions: does the unjust judgment of virtue 
necessarily imply an escape by (or approval for) the vile? should it matter to 
the virtuous-or to the vile-how the other is judged? would it be best to 
be virtuous and to be esteemed so or  to be vile and get away with it? is what 
the world calls "vileness" really a "just pleasure," and, if so, what is the 
real nature of what the world calls "virtue"? This tissue of questions and 
implications, which is required to  fill the discursive gap between the primary 
meanings of  lines 1 and 2, radiates indignation; and, taken with the 
subordinate meaning of the line-pair, which cynically approves of vileness 
in a world that condemns both the vile and virtuous alike, it gives a 
powerful focus to the conflict between personal integrity and social en- 
croachment. 
The impression given by these lines of a determined personal resistance 
to public opinion is clarified and augmented in the rest of the poem. Sonnet 
129 opens as a public declamation of essentially dogmatic wisdom and then 
advances, by means of refinements and expansions, to more inward and 
more comprehensive statements; 121, however, although public in its 
opening, becomes more so in course and reaches, at the beginning of the 
third quatrain, the resounding proclamation, "I am that I am." Sonnet 129 
draws its reader continually deeper into its workings, ending at last with a 
judgment on the quaIity and value of his knowledge. But in 121, although 
the poet confronts the reader at first with a tissue of complexities, his 
communication is otherwise direct. The antithetical figures after line 1, 
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most of which are syntactically progressive, are essentially straightforward. 
In lines 5 and 6, for instance, Shakespeare has opposed the subject of his 
sentence, "eyes," to  the object of a preposition, "blood"; and in lines 9-10 
he has balanced the verb of a subordinate clause against the verb of the 
main clause. By using such practices, the poet shares his thoughts with his 
reader exactly as they occur to him, as it were; and, as a consequence, he 
appears to be a tremendously candid person. The reader may thus sym- 
pathize with the poet and approve, especially, of his honesty. But the poet's 
claim of virtually divine singularity, however the reader may judge this, 
disallows any identification with him. The reader is hardly prompted, on 
the other hand, to line himself up with society, to which, however, because 
of the generality of the poet's social recognition, he must in some sense 
belong. In 121, then, the poet has isolated himself from all public censure 
and all personal sympathy. He has, at the same time, isolated the separate 
members of his readership and forced each of them to  observe and judge his 
moral stance with a deep but ambivalent sense of personal implication. 
The poet's singularity, which is evident in the bitter tone of the first 
quatrain, gradually develops toward comedy . 2  The whole second quatrain, 
which expands on the impropriety of "others' seeing," invests the lewd 
prying of "false adulterate eyes" and the scandalized surveillance of 
"frailer spies" with satiric annoyance; and in the third quatrain these spies 
are turned out of doors, transformed into clownish archers who "level" at 
one target and "reckon up" the score on another. The poet also includes 
himself in these comic developments. His defiance modulates from the 
romantic "our" to the grandiose "I am that I am," an echo of the divine 
self-assertion in Exodus, that must focus laughter on the all-too-human 
poet, and thus allows the reader to  remain detached from both parties. At 
the same time, of course, this echo underscores a profound ethical dilemma: 
one who honors public opinion, as it is here represented, must be an absurd, 
a transparent hypocrite; but one who ignores it must puff himself up into a 
god. 
The intensities of 121 are, in accordance with its diffused focus and its 
comic design, not cumulative, as in 129, but local. Shakespeare reaches 
points of resolution in this poem, not only at the end of the separate qua- 
trains, every one of which is syntactically isolated, but even within separate 
line-pairs and, to some extent, separate lines. The opening chiasmus, unlike 
that which commences 129, is sharply defined by the first line; and the last 
line of each quatrain enforces an antithesis that ties it off from what 
follows. Each quatrain has its own special tone and quality: the first 
enunciates a serious ethical preference; the second develops a pair of 
debaters' questions; and the third asserts and rationalizes a personal 
determination. The expressive result of such a segmentation is not fragmen- 
tariness, however, but stability. The encapsulated exposition retards the 
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flow of the poem and strongly modifies the kinds of shift and spread by 
which the poet elsewhere, especially in 129, has entangled his reader. Each 
segment of 121 illuminates some aspect of the poet's persistently held in- 
dependence, enforcing the firmness and the consistency of his position. 
These segments vary in quality, tending to be livelier in the first line-pair of 
each quatrain and more stable in the second. The couplet is cast in a minor 
key, punctuating a subordinate "unIess" clause that refines the argument 
by entertaining alternatives to it. This rhythmical system and especially the 
diminished couplet, which acts somewhat like a musical coda, underscore 
the steadiness of the poet's attitude and the completeness of his com- 
munication. 
Certain of the local effects repay scrutiny, We have acknowledged the 
impression of conflict and the complex of suggestions embedded in the first 
line-pair. The first syllable of "esteemed," we may notice further, raises 
"vi1e"to the highest degree and helps justify the first haIf of the first line: it 
would obviously be better to be "vile" than to be "vilest." Shakespeare 
explicitly made a vile-vilest distinction, by the way, in Sonnet 71.' The 
expression "of being," again, although its primary force is determined by 
its relationship with "not to be," suggests the poet's awareness of social 
hypocrisy, which he will deplore in the second quatrain and analyze in the 
third. Other relevant meanings and relationships-the possible reference 
of "SO" to "pleasure" and the possible contradiction of "so" by "notH-- 
are similarly suppressed by the poet's metrical and rhetorical emphases. 
Although these practices tuck away some meanings at the edge of the ut- 
terance, however, they strengthen and underscore others. Shakespeare has 
infused the term "feeling" in line 4, for instance, with intensely tactile 
indications:"eing opposed to the sense of sight, a sense the poet 
acknowledges here with contempt, it indicates the physical touches, the 
fleshly interpenetrations, shared by lovers-hence "ow- feelingupthat 
the alien world has agreed, on the basis of a distant and flickering ap- 
prehension, to  call "vile." 
The intensities of the second quatrain derive less from meter and 
rhetoric than from diction and figure. The relatively abstract "feeling" of 
the first quatrain, for instance, is represented here as "sportive blood"; and 
"others' seeing" is correspondingly intensified. By using the loaded term, 
"salutation," moreover, Shakespeare has personified the opposing sub- 
stantives and presented the figure of hypocritical courtiers ("eyes9')- 
paired like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern-greeting with self-conscious 
formality their Iord or king (L'b100d").5 "Salutation" is itself richly 
s~gges t ive .~  Since this term often represents an early-morning greeting, it 
recalls the conventional interruption of lovers by the awakening world; its 
suggestions of courtesy, however, are comically at odds with the aggressive 
voyeurism that it must here indicate. And if we trace the term back to its 
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root meaning, a formal wish of continued health and strength, the comic 
anomaly is heightened still further. The substitution of "frailties" for 
"sportive blood," an effect enforced by the proximity of these expressions, 
may not be comical, but it is surely satiric. The poet has obviously replaced, 
with an appropriate shift in tone, his own description of his activities with 
the cant of public morality. And the opposition embedded in these 
synonyms presents another anomaly: the more often and the more 
vigorously the poet's "sportive blood" manifests itself, the greater will be 
his imputed "frailties." "Frailties" also enriches "frailer," with which it is 
rhetorically balanced: the spies may be truly frailer than the poet and thus 
reproachful out of envious impotence; or "frailer" in the same sense in 
which the poet is frail and thus hypocritical in their censure of him: more 
than their "eyes" may be "adulterate"; or,  rather, their eyes may have 
become infected by their lives. The equivocal term "wills," in the last line 
of this quatrain, carries on these satiric suggestions: the social judges may 
willfully condemn the poet's lecheries, that is, they may speak from a 
position of dogmatic self-righteousness; or they may be inadvertently 
acknowledging something in themselves, that is, their own secret appetite,' 
which they profess to abhor in him. 
Quatrain 3, which opens with the resounding proclamation of personal 
independence, also introduces a couple of new figures: first, that of the 
archery match. When people publicly take aim at the sins of another, as the 
development of this figure indicates, they actually reckon up their own sins; 
and they do so, moreover, without realizing it. Still another new figure, 
introduced in line 11, strengthens and extends this point. The poet's 
distinction between "straight" and "bevel," since it refers to our 
relationship with the earth's surface and our gravitational dependency, has 
an inescapably universal relevance: it implies the egoism of every human 
judge and the relativity of every human judgment: "All things to the vile 
seem vile," we recollect from the plays; and, on the other hand, "All's not 
offense that indiscretion finds." This gravitational figure draws strength 
from "level" in the lines just above, recalling the earth's pull on an arrow 
and the necessity for a compensatory aim.* This whole quatrain is thus 
focused on the point that a perfectly, a surely, straight or level judgment is 
simply not available t o  humankind. We should notice the poet's tactful use 
of the subjunctive here: he "may be straight." Thus the poet relocates his 
argument in quatrain 3, basing it not on a divine fury and intransigence, but 
on the narrowness of human powers and the relativity of human positions. 
The maintenance of a universal evil by human society, which is 
acknowledged in the couplet-acknowledged in the category c'unless"-is, 
thus, or ought to be impossible. This is not to deny that society or its 
spokesmen have argued that badness reigns in this world nor that they have 
attempted, further, to impose their own hypocrisies upon it-the term 
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"maintain" activates these two prongs of the supposition. However, the 
poet's determination to resist social pressure and abide by his own feeIing 
and his own judgment, although this may require an emotional fury, a 
willingness to be the god of his own affairs, rests finally and firmly on a 
rational consideration of living experience. And although his individual 
readers may not, by the very nature of the case, sympathize with the poet, 
they should follow his lead. Their doing so will cancel the bad opinion and 
redeem the evil world, the possibility of which the couplet represents. 
In each of the sonnets just analyzed, 104, 121, and 129-as well as in 
116 and 124-Shakespeare has placed some narrowly personal interest or 
experience into a dynamic relationship with some broadly human or natural 
concern. In examining the apparent exemption from temporal process of a 
young friend, in asserting the social independence of his own sportive 
blood, and in discriminating between general and particular understandings 
of lust, the poet has produced within the narrow confines of single sonnets 
discourses of intense personal involvement and impressive genera1 
significance, his ambitious polarity of attention forcing him in each of these 
cases to  articulate a literary tissue of remarkable poetic scope. 
Shakespeare's determination to accomplish such a poetic tissue within 
his individual sonnets, a determination that set him apart from his fellow 
 sonneteer^,^ is evident again and again in the collection. In Sonnets 30 and 
66, for instance, the poet draws his intimate affections into poems of other- 
wise general interest, poems, that is, in which such feelings seem to have no 
real business. In the couplet of each one-if not until the couplet-he 
opposes an exposition of his general dissatisfaction with his life (30) and his 
world (66) with sudden references to his "friend" and his "love." This shift 
of attention is dramatized in 30 by the couplet's being actually addressed to 
the friend. In line 12 of Sonnet 64, again, Shakespeare narrows a general 
rumination, focusing his attention finally on the realization "That Time 
will come and take my love away"; and in the couplet of Sonnet 54, he 
addresses a particular consolation, which he has derived from the general 
discourse above, to a youth of his close acquaintance. Shakespeare often 
interposes general concerns, likewise, into poems of originally particular 
content. In the couplet of Sonnet 73, for instance, and in lines 11-12 of 
Sonnet 119, he derives some general wisdom from explicitly personal ad- 
dresses; and in the last line of 105, he introduces an opinion on the general 
prevalence of fairness, kindness, and truth into a discussion of the meeting 
of these qualities in his own beloved. 
To insist on the exceptional nature of a particular case, as Shakespeare 
does in 105, is common enough in the exaltations of such figures as Idea, 
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Delia, and Stella throughout the sonnet tradition. But even when Shake- 
speare deals with an exception, as he does in Sonnet 130, he charac- 
teristically integrates his own feelings and his own affairs with natural and 
normal human life. 
My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun; 
Coral is far more red than her lips' red; 
I f  snow be white, why then her breasis are dun; 
If hairs be wires, black wires grow on  her head. 
I have seen roses damasked, red and white, 
But no such roses see I in her cheeks; 
And in some perfumes is there more delight 
Than in the breath that from my mistress reeks. 
I love to hear her speak; yet well I know 
That music hath a far more pleasing sound. 
I grant I never saw a goddess go: 
My mistress, when she walks, treads on  the ground. 
And yet, by heaven, I think my love as rare 
As any she belied with falsecompare. 
The ambivalence of "she" in the last line, that is, its susceptibility to being 
interpreted either as the poet's mistress or  as "any she," may suggest the 
scope Shakespeare seems almost instinctively to  have striven for. Through- 
out this famous poem, he describes his mistress as an exception, not to 
nature, but to the conventionally applied Petrarchan exaltations: her 
"eyes," being nothing like the sun, her "breath," which does not compare 
with perfume, and her "breasts," which are not as white as snow, are, as 
the words themselves indicate, natural human eyes and breath and breasts, 
Her tread, likewise, although the poet's limited experience disallows any 
kind of comparison with the gait of a goddess, declares her sisterhood with 
all the other women in the world. The exceptionality of this mistress, then, 
which is an exceptionality to  the Petrarchan convention, amounts to a richly 
apprehended conformity to nature. Shakespeare's colleagues, if they 
acknowledged any concern beyond their love or their beloved, did so 
commonly to deny any connection, any bond of relevance, between their 
unique situation and the mundane universe. But Shakespeare, by asserting 
the differences between his beloved and such perfectly remote beings, 
reveals once again his ambition to relate every most particular concern he 
has with the realms of nature and life that all people inhabit. His mistress is 
judged, finally, with oxymoronic wit, to  be "as rare / As any," and thus to 
be a woman of woman born. 
The humbler lover is, of course, the more ambitious poet. And for us 
to recognize this persistent poetic ambition of Shakespeare's is to grasp 
another important evaluative principle, the principle of scope. Some of his 
pointedly personal sonnets, truly, such as that addressed to his mistress 
while she is playing music (128) and those that focus on his own first name 
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(135, 136), make no universal claims; others, as we have already 
acknowledged, make belated, incidental, or excessive claims. A few such 
poems, however, establish wider frames of reference that rival in substance 
and significance the signs of temporal process represented in 104, the 
hypocritical society confronted in 121, and the knowing world indicated in 
129. It is to such poems that the next chapter is devoted. 
NOTES 
1. "Then" and "Than" are spelled "then" throughout the 1609 edition of Sonnets; and 
"than" is often, although not always, spelled "then" in the first folio of the plays. This or- 
thographic conflation, according to O.E.D., IX, ii (1919), p. 244, almost became established in 
our language during the sixteenth century. 
2. In Poetic Closure (Chicago: Chicago, 1968), pp. 143-145, Barbara Herrnstein Smith 
describes 121 very differently from me; its couplet, which seems to me to radiate personal firm- 
ness and confidence, she describes as "a confession of desperation and perplexity." 
3.  In the 1609 printing of 71, the superlative degree is spelled "vildest"; but "vilest" is 
also Shakespearean, as in I Henry I V ,  V ,  iv, 91, in which Hal represents Hotspur's grave as 
"two paces of the vilest Earthw-or, at all events, thus reads the f~rst folio. 
4. Shakespeare, who often distinguished between the different senses, has done so at 
length in Sonnet 141, in which he describes "tender feeling to base touches prone." 
5. In Shakespeare, as in general usage, the socially or politically inferior person usually 
"salutes" his superior: see, for instance, Richard III, 111, vii, 239; Venus and Adonis, 859; 
K~ng John, 11, i, 30; and Antony and Cleopatra, 111, xii, 1 I-in all of which the impression of 
obeisance in a "salutation" is manifest. 
6. The O.E.D., VIII, ii (1914), p. 67, has described thisemployment of "saIutation" as a 
"nonce" usage. 
7. See especially Sonnet 136 for an extended use of "will" to indicate sexual appetite and, 
indeed, sexual performance. 
8. Distance shooting (on which, see 2 Henry IV, 111, ii, 41-49) naturally required the 
archer to "level" his aim well above the level of the ground. One shoots on a dead level only at 
extremely close range. Thus "level" itself acknowledges the necessity of one's arching his 
arrows in order to achieve a straight shot. See H. Walrond, "Archery" in Shakespeare's En- 
gland (Oxford: Clarendon, 1916), vol. 11, pp. 376-389. See also for Shakespeare's own 
knowledge of archery: Love's Labor's Lost, IV, i, 106-139; King Lear, IV, vi, 85-95; Pericles, 
I, i, 160-164; and Sonnet 117, 11-12. 
9. Joan Grundy, "Shakespeare's Sonnets and the Elizabethan Sonneteers," Shakespeare 
Survey 15 (1962): 41-49, for example, notes that other sonneteers acknowledged the world 
merely as a "spectator" of the beloved's unparalleled beauty and their own unparalleled love; 
and argues that Shakespeare both transformed the world into a "participator" and gave his 
sonnets, generally, a new philosophical and critical depth. 
